At the pre-trial stage of counter-terrorist investigations, an 'Anglo-Saxon' indulgence towards street-level policing powers has been brought to task by European human rights norms, especially privacy, which are exerting new forms of control over policing discretion and opening judicial oversight over traditional policing activity. This article examines these trends in relation to suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search. While the European Court of Human Rights applied robust scrutiny in the case of Gillan v United Kingdom, in stark contrast to approach by the House of Lords, there exists a number of challenges which are threatening to weaken judicial scrutiny in this area. First, more recent European Court of Human Rights cases show a more indulgent stance being taken towards policing powers.
Introduction
Street policing powers are notoriously difficult to control: the actions take place away from the oversight of supervisors where the 'norms and practices of the street level police officer take priority over outside regulation '. 1 It is trite among criminologists that police cultures can be resistant to legal rules which some argue are simply ignored or act solely as a means of framing officer's (prior) conduct. 2 While accepting that legal rules do not necessarily simply translate into 'blue letter' law and that it can be difficult to exert control, 3 particularly through legal rules, over street policing, the issue to be addressed here is the shall, in the absence of express language or necessary implication, interpret the power narrowly so as to avoid or minimise the infringement. 6 The claimants drew on the Divisional
Court's depiction of section 44 as 'sweeping and far beyond anything ever permitted by common law powers' to argue that the power should be exercised only when necessary. 7 Lord Bingham, giving the leading judgment, dismissed this curtly by noting that '"expedient" has a meaning quite distinct from "necessary"'. 8 In the absence of ambiguity, the principle of legality did not apply.
The second claim related to the practice of the Metropolitan Police Service, which had a rolling, force-wide authorisation in place from February 2001 until July 2009. 9 This 'extraordinary' 10 power, nominally limited to a twenty-eight day authorisation, 11 was thus in force constantly for over eight years across an area of 620 square miles. 12 The claimants argued the power was not needed across the whole Metropolitan police force area. A senior police officer and civil servant, speaking on behalf of the Secretary of State, gave statements that the threat was dispersed across the entire area and that it was impracticable to try and differentiate between different areas within the force area. The claimants had declined to examine, under special procedures, the closed intelligence supporting the authorisations and provided no evidence to contradict the statements given. It is therefore unsurprising that the House of Lords rejected this ground. Even if there had been evidence which raised doubts, rather than clearly contradicting, the statements given, it seems likely that the court would have shown deference given the nexus of national security, previously described by Lord Diplock as being 'par excellence a non-justiciable question'. 13 The weak scrutiny applied to the issue of the rolling authorisation is more surprising.
While repeated authorisations during extended periods between 2001 and 2008 would have been both conceivable and, arguably, acceptable on the basis of the threat -for example after the July 7, 2005 bombings in London, it is simply untenable that the entire Metropolitan area needed to be subjected to this power for over eight years. The constant usage for seven months prior to 9/11 suggests either extraordinary prescience or the misuse of the power.
While, again, the witness statements argued the continuous authorisations were necessary and there was no contradictory expert evidence, this could -and should -have been approached as an issue of statutory interpretation rather than policy. If Parliament had intended to provide a permanent power to the police it could have done so. Instead the power was circumscribed by a twenty-eight day limit, underlining its extraordinary nature. Repeated authorisations may have been necessary at times of heightened risk, but continuous authorisations over eight years, amounting nearly to a state of permanence, did not accord with the intention of Parliament.
Only the claims relating to human rights were discussed by subsequently the ECtHR in Gillan v UK. 14 The following will mirror the approach of the ECtHR, giving a brief overview of Article 5, 10 and 11, while focusing on Article 8 and whether the power was prescribed by law.
The key issue in relation to the right to liberty under Article 5 was whether the action passed the threshold test from a restriction of movement, 15 to a deprivation of liberty. The instructions relating to the threshold test are relatively clear: one must start with the claimant's actual situation and take into account 'criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.' 16 The practice, however, is a morass. For example, ten hours curfew a day is not a deprivation of liberty, 17 nor is house arrest for twelve hours each weekday and all weekend. 18 By contrast, restricting someone for a matter of minutes while forcibly taking a blood sample is a deprivation of liberty. 19 While the ECtHR implied that Article 5 would apply in the context of section 44, it seems unlikely in light of the later case of Austin v UK, discussed below, that an ordinary stop and search would now be deemed to have crossed the threshold. 20 Nonetheless, the House of Lords' treatment of the issue may be criticised on two grounds. First, it focused on the length of the deprivation, which is not determinative and was disputed on the facts. 21 Second, while noting the concrete situation in terms of the fact that the persons stopped would 'not be arrested, handcuffed, confined or removed to another place', the court failed to discuss the fact that failure to submit to a search was a criminal offence punishable by up to six month imprisonment and/or a fine. 22 This was the key issue for the ECtHR, which, while declining to rule on the issue, stated that such coercion 'is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5(1)'. 23 Rather surprisingly, the House of Lords failed to consider in any depth the application of Articles 10 or 11 to the particular situation of the claimants who were, respectively, attending and reporting on a peaceful protest. Lord Bingham simply stated that it would be 'hard to conceive of circumstances' in which the power would infringe either right if exercised in accordance with the statute and Code A'. 24 If it did, he continued, it would be justifiable under the second paragraph of the relevant Article. 25 'Code A' is a statutory code of practice governing the exercise of statutory stop and search powers by police officers. 26 Breach of the Code constitutes neither a civil nor criminal offence but may be considered in questions about the admissibility of evidence. 27 Section 44 and Code A were so broad that Lord Bingham's assertion is itself questionable, but even leaving that aside, it is very strange that the court felt no need to discuss the particular facts of the claimants. The student had been on his way to protest and turned back following the stop and search. This appears to be a quintessential example of the chilling effect. The journalist, who was accredited and had a press badge, was prevented from covering the protest for between five and thirty minutes.
Again, there appears at the very least an arguable case that her right to free speech and assembly were infringed. Certainly, the facts surely merited more than nine and a half lines of discussion.
The ECtHR did not consider Article 10 or 11, given their conclusions in relation to Article 8, although they did note the risk that such a widely framed power could be misused against demonstrators and protestors. 28 Declining to discuss rights that apply in only certain circumstances having concluded that the routine exercise of section 44 would unjustifiably infringe the right to a private life is more defensible than the approach taken by the House of Lords. Nevertheless, it is disappointing as attention to expressive rights would have provided useful dicta on the interaction between national security policing powers and those rights, which come into conflict with far more frequency than the issues coming before the courts. It is an old and cherished tradition of our country that everyone should be free to go about their business in the streets of the land, confident that they will not be stopped and searched by the police unless reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence. So jealously has this tradition been guarded that it has almost become a constitutional principle. 30 There is a distinction between police powers which are exercised on the 'streets of the land' and at borders. While some airport travel is, of course, internal, the vast majority in the UKsome 80% between 2003 and 2013 -of flights are international. 31 Therefore, the issue falls to be considered within the norms of border practices which have always been subject to distinct and more onerous conditions of passage than travel within a country. Moreover, as argued by the ECtHR, which was 'unpersuaded by the analogy', travellers at airports give some degree of 'consent' to being subject to heightened security, including being searched, by choosing to travel by air. 32 There is no comparable choice for people going about their daily business on the streets of London. The search is therefore 'qualitatively different'. 33 Absent consent, the norm is that the police cannot interfere with a person unless they reasonably suspect the person has, is or is about to commit an offence.
The ECtHR also disagreed with the House of Lords' conclusions regarding routine searches. Again, the coercive nature of the power was central to the court's reasoning that any section 44 search would constitute 'a clear interference with the right to respect for private life'. 34 Drawing attention to the public nature of the search, it noted that this could 'compound the seriousness of the interference because of an element of humiliation and embarrassment'. 35 For an infringement to the rights under Article 5, 8, 10 and 11 to be justified the power must be prescribed by law. This principle has three core components. First, the power must have a basis in law, which includes non-codified law. 36 Second, the exercise of the power must be foreseeable so as to allow individuals to regulate their conduct. 37 Third, the measure must be sufficiently bounded to guard against the abuse of power. 38 It was accepted by both courts that the first limb was satisfied, the power having a basis in the 2000 Act and in Code A. 39 The others proved more problematic.
In terms of the authorisation, the nominal safeguards were that the authorisation could only be given by an Assistant Chief Constable or higher ranked officer if 'expedient' for the prevention of terrorism, was limited geographically and temporally, and had to be subject to confirmation by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. 40 The difficulty with these is that while on their face they appear to exert control over the authorisation process, the practice -well known by the time of the case -clearly revealed their inadequacy. While the House of Lords appeared content to rely on the statements given by the police and government witnesses, the ECtHR referred to the actual practice of the police in determining that the safeguards were inadequate. The total failure of the geographical and temporal limits has been discussed. A central issue for the ECtHR was the trigger of 'expediency' which it condemned as being of so low as standard as to preclude any consideration of proportionality. 41 As regards the confirmation process, the Home Secretary queried 'a few' 42 authorisations and appears 43 to have refused only one -with a new application approved the following day. 44 The sense of rubber-stamping was confirmed when it was disclosed in 2010
(after the ECtHR's ruling) that thirty-five authorisations had been confirmed which purported to run over the maximum twenty-eight day period. 45 While not discussed by the ECtHR, the authorisations were not made public. Initially forces refused to confirm or deny whether they had an authorisation in place and even when this changed, the forces did not take active steps to notify the public an authorisation was in force. 46 The limitations of these nominal safeguards led the ECtHR to conclude that 'the width of the statutory powers is such that applicants face formidable obstacles in showing that any authorisation and confirmation are ultra vires or an abuse of power'. 47 In terms of the deployment of the power, Lord Bingham argued that, while no suspicion was required, the power 'cannot, realistically, be interpreted as a warrant to stop and search people who are obviously not terrorist suspects, which would be futile and timewasting'. 48 This raises some questionable presumptions about being able to spot someone who is 'obviously' a terrorist. 49 It also contradicts the practice whereby, with the notable exception of specific intelligence-led patrols, the power was predominantly used on persons who were under no suspicion of being terrorists, 50 as borne out by the exceptionally low hitrate. 51 This is predictable given that the power's primarily objective for the police was deterrence and disruption. 52 The House of Lords also pointed to Code A as providing an effective curb on the arbitrary deployment of the power, however, as noted by the ECtHR, this only relates to how officers are to proceed once they have stopped someone, it provides no guidance nor restrictions on who should be stopped. 53 There are therefore only two significant limitations on the deployment of the power. It must be exercised for counter-terrorism purposes and the object of the search must be articles of a kind that could be used in connection with terrorism. In relation to the former, the problem is enforcement: it would be exceptionally difficult to prove an officer stopped a person for different reasons, as underlined by Gillan itself. In relation to the latter, as noted by the ECtHR, 'terrorism' is defined so broadly that the object of the search was 'a very wide category which could cover many articles commonly carried by people in the streets'. 54 The
ECtHR pointed to the low hit-rate and to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation's criticisms in his annual review of terrorism legislation that examples of 'poor and unnecessary use of s.44 abound.' 55 While not raised on the facts, both courts discussed, obiter dicta, the potential for infringement of the prohibition against discrimination, under the ECHR, Article 14, with the ECtHR referring to the statistical evidence of the power's disproportionate use against black and Asian persons. 56 In relation to the deployment of the power, the ECtHR concluded that 'there is a clear risk of arbitrariness in the grant of such a broad discretion to the police officer'. 57 Following the refusal of their application to appeal, the UK Government initially raised the authorisation trigger to 'necessary' and limited the use of section 44 to vehicular searches, 58 before repealing the power and replacing it, initially with an interim power 59 and then permanently with section 47A. 60 This raised the authorisation trigger to 'necessary', requiring also that the authorising officer 'reasonably suspects' that an act of terrorism will take place. The maximum time limit is now fourteen days and the statute specifically requires that the geographical and temporal limits be 'no more than necessary' to prevent the act of terrorism. 61 Rolling authorisations are nominally prohibited although the new Code of Practice envisages successive authorisation applications. 62 The object of the search is slightly narrowed to evidence that the person is a terrorist or the vehicle is being use for terrorist purposes. 63 While there are some important improvements here, notably in relation to the trigger, the discretions bestowed on authorising officers and those exercising the power remain exceptionally broad. Whether the replacement version sufficiently addresses the ECtHR's concerns remains open to debate as the power has never been used in Great Britain, 64 despite events such as the Olympics and Royal Wedding in 2012, although it has been used once in Northern Ireland.
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Challenges to intensive judicial oversight
The robust decision of the ECtHR in Gillan appeared to settle the issue of how intensive judicial oversight of counter-terrorist street policing powers should be. 66 However, a three-pronged challenge is now prompting a shift back towards weaker judicial oversight.
These are: recent caselaw from the ECtHR which evidences a less robust scrutiny over policing powers; the precautionary nature of section 44; and, the greater reluctance to exert intensive oversight in relation to counter-terrorist powers of general application than those of individual application. There are four core differences between the authorisation of preventive searches and of those under section 44. First, the trigger for preventive searches is higher than the equivalent trigger for section 44. However, in practice prior violent weapons incidents were sufficient to trigger designation of an area. Second, the temporal limits are different. The security risk areas were initially designated for six months in November 2002, with repeated authorisations are considerably longer than section 44 authorisations were, the end result of rolling authorisations is common to both. The Dutch innovation is the added requirement that the public prosecutor thereafter empowers the police for twelve hour periods. Third, the process is led by the Burgomaster in the Netherlands, albeit in consultation with the police and public prosecutor, whereas section 44 was police led, with confirmation by the Home Secretary. The ECtHR emphasised the value of the safeguard of democratic control over preventive searches. In this aspect they may have been pointing to the Burgomaster's central role and also to the facts that the Local Council had passed the bylaw permitting the designation of security risk areas and that it could be repealed or amended with more ease than primary legislation. 70 Fourth, the designation of a security risk area was made public.
While there is more democratic involvement, by way of the Burgomaster, the authorisation process for preventive searches remains highly discretionary. The role of the public prosecutor may act as an effective curb on arbitrary authorisations; however, on paper the role of the Secretary of State could have done the same. The question is the practice, which, in contrast to their approach in Gillan, the ECtHR did not discuss.
In terms of deployment, the discretion afforded to Dutch officers was narrower in that the object was offensive weapons, which is considerably more circumscribed than 'articles that could be used in connection with terrorism.' However, these remain suspicionless stops and searches, with the accompanying exceptionally broad discretion and were coercive:
failure to submit to a search constituted a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to three months' imprisonment. 71 Remarkably, the ECtHR's response was to note that the police were briefed and debriefed -as the officers deploying section 44 were -and that 'they were given no latitude in deciding when to exercise their powers, which ruled out any risk of arbitrariness.' 72 This is nonsense. The discretion of concern here is that of the officer in choosing whom to stop; whether it is within one hour, twelve hours or twenty days, the discretion remains the same.
An important differential for the ECtHR was that the Dutch Government was able to rely upon two independent studies that attested to the effectiveness of the powers, 74 There was no discussion in Colon of the potential for preventive searches to be disproportionately used against ethnic minorities, nor was the issue discussed in detail in the reports attesting to the power's effectiveness. There is little research on the matter, but the EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey has shown that, at least some, ethnic minorities in the Netherlands believe they are being targeted for stop and search by the police because of their ethnicity. 
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The claimants in the case had been held in Oxford Circus in central London for seven and half hours without access to toilet facilities, food, water or shelter. 83 This is not analogous to waiting to exit a football stadium nor to being stuck in one's car on a motorway. The former is subject to consent, the latter is arguably not a deprivation of liberty, it is choice between abandoning one's property or not (again -a choice). 84 As noted in the dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki, the intention of the measure has no place in determining whether there has been a deprivation of liberty or not; it is relevant only to the application of the sub-paragraphs of Article 5(1). The expansion by the ECtHR of the requirement to consider the '"type" and "manner of implementation"' 85 in Guzzardi v Italy to include 'purpose' has no precedence. 86 What is more, there was no need to create this ambiguous and dangerous precedent; the ECtHR could simply have argued the situation did not cross the threshold test as it was without adding the new criteria of purpose.
Leaving to one side the difficulties with the Austin judgment, the interest here is the intensity of the scrutiny which the court applied to the police action, which was low. The
ECtHR strongly emphasised subsidiarity and the difficulties of modern policing, particularly policing crowds able to organise themselves by way of social media. 87 These are valid points, first instance. 88 But the difference between the four claimants -three of whom were simply passing through the area and became caught in the cordon -was deemed irrelevant. 89 Nor was the issue, discussed in the dissenting opinion, that the findings of fact suggest that the decision to kettle was one taken for expediency and that 'the police could have been expected to apply less intrusive means'. 90 Austin is a far cry from the scrutiny applied by the ECtHR in
Gillan.
The ebbing of intensive judicial oversight, if that is what Austin and Colon signify, could be partially prompted by realpolitik on the part of the ECtHR. Certainly Austin, with its emphasis on subsidiarity, appeared to be addressing, at least in part, the trenchant criticism of the Court's jurisprudence among some British politicians, political parties and media. 91 While this section of the article has shown that the intensity of judicial scrutiny evident in Gillan was not replicated in Colon or Austin, two swallows do not a summer make nor do two cases prove a 'trend'. However, they do suggest that caution should be exercised before hailing the scrutiny applied in Gillan as the norm. Whether Gillan is the high tide of judicial scrutiny is likely to take years to determine.
Oversight of precautionary powers and measures of general application
Another challenge to effective oversight relates to the precautionary nature of suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search. Suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search is emblematic of all-risks policing in which the risk calculation is reversed, shifting from 'persons to actions and objects'. 92 In placing persons under suspicion in advance of any risky behaviour on their part, powers such as section 44 adopt a precautionary stance. Thus, action is taken before the risk materialises, or even before it is known whether the risk will materialise, on the basis that the consequences of a successful attack would be too grave. As with pre-emptive criminal measures, 93 precautionary ones raise a variety of problems for the criminal law. 94 Of these, two are of particular relevance to judicial scrutiny of such powers.
First, precautionary measures require vague drafting. As these measures are designed to operate in conditions of uncertainty, it is not possible to draft the power with a high degree of specificity. Just as precautionary offences tend to be defined in 'broad, imprecise terms', 95 so too precautionary policing powers are broadly drafted. To do otherwise would undermine the entire purpose of precaution, which is to allow action when there is no certainty. Second, for similar reasons, precautionary measures require broad discretion be bestowed upon the officer. Precautionary measures are designed to permit action when it is unclear from whom the threat will emerge, if at all. In such circumstances it is impossible to delineate discretion.
The prime constraint in all-risks policing measures is their geographical range: the location is deemed to be at risk therefore all persons entering it are presumed to be suspicious until proven otherwise. However, this does little to curb the discretion of an officer regarding who to stop.
Of course, the issue is not the discretion itself but rather the potential for arbitrary treatment which this affords. One way of addressing this, used with analogous US counterterrorist suspicionless stop and search powers in the US, 96 is to apply a pre-determined selection rate, such as stopping every fifth person. While circumventing the potential for the arbitrary exercise of the power, this approach has a number of flaws. It is predictable, potentially allowing would-be terrorists to avoid being searched, although this could be circumvented by cycling different selection rates or by applying random selection criteria.
Such an approach prevents officers from deploying the power when there is, for example, a weak indication by a police dog or behavioural analysis that falls short of reasonable suspicion. In domestic law it would constitute the fettering of a discretion with policy which is not permitted under administrative law, 97 although this could be addressed by the statute explicitly permitting such an approach. More problematic are the statements by both the HL and the ECtHR in Gillan disapproving the practice of stopping persons who are obviously not suspicious. 98 The most effective way of ensuring deterrence while limiting the potential for arbitrary selection is to subject every person in the area to a search, thereby extinguishing the officers' discretion. This is the approach taken in airports, albeit often with an added layer of enhanced security applied to those deemed suspicious and/or chosen by way of predetermined selection criteria. This approach can only work in limited geographical areas where there is a clear through-flow of persons and people are aware in advance of the security systems and prepare for them by attending the location with time to spare. This approach cannot operate in public areas where persons are unaware in advance that they will be subjected to a search and consequential delays. Nor could such an approach work with mass transit systems such as the London Underground. The core function of such systems is to rapidly transport extremely large numbers of people. While safety is an important concern, applying airport style searches would undermine the prime objective of mass transport systems by unduly slowing down the flow of passengers. Moreover, it still does not answer the courts' concern regarding the targeting of persons of whom there is obviously no suspicion. In the airport scenario this is addressed by presuming implied consent is given by travellers. It is questionable whether such reasoning can apply to mass transit systems on which most passengers travel by necessity.
Beyond limiting officers' discretion, the alternative, if such powers are to be used, is to ensure close oversight ex ante of the authorisation and post hoc of both the authorisation and deployment. Much of this would most effectively be done by relevant public bodies, such as the Home Secretary in Gillan -were the role, of course to be more than rubberstampingor the public prosecutor and Local Council in Colon, external reviewers such as the UK's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 99 parliamentary committees and community bodies. The role of the court would be to ensure, as they did in Gillan, that these bodies actually exert close scrutiny and to demand evidence of such, unlike the unquestioning acceptance of effectiveness that occurred in Colon.
The authorisation of such powers could be subjected to judicial confirmation, whether as an alternative or in addition to oversight by other bodies. This could enable close, independent scrutiny providing a robust method of oversight. In Colon, while the ECtHR rejected the claim that prior judicial control was required to ensure a power is prescribed by law, it acknowledged that it was 'desirable in principle'. 100 The question therefore becomes whether it is 'feasible in practice'? 101 The answer is yes and there is precedence for such practice in the UK with the judicial oversight of extensions to pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects under the Terrorism Act 2000, section 41, and in relation to Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures. 102 One final concern is that within counter-terrorism, measures of general application, like suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search under section 44, have arguably suffered from even less scrutiny than individualised powers, whether from policy makers, academics or judges. This occurs in part because of the diffused impact of such measures, in part because some of their costs fall upon the private sector who are willing to bear them, and, in part because the impact of some of the measures is less obvious, as with, for example, mass surveillance. 103 Police powers of general application have a chequered history in this regard. Miranda in which issues of expressive rights were briefly considered). 108 Another is on appeal to the ECtHR.
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Conclusion
The intensive scrutiny applied in Gillan by the ECtHR in analysing the legal issues and in particular the actual practice of suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search under section 44 contrasts sharply with the approach taken by the House of Lords. The ECtHR's judgment stands out further given that it dealt with street policing and counter-terrorism, two areas where intensive judicial oversight has often been lacking. However, subsequent judgments by the ECtHR appear to show a less robust scrutiny being applied.
The precautionary nature of suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search, and the fact that the powers are counter-terrorist measures of general application, suggest that, even at its zenith, judicial scrutiny may not be sufficient to manage the challenges presented. Such powers necessitate close oversight ex ante and post hoc. This requires analysis not only by the judiciary but also the legislature, including parliamentary committees, independent experts -such as the UK's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and community bodies who can provide a bridge towards legitimacy. 110 The judges should not shoulder the entire burden and, adapting from Ben Bowling's call in relation policing, perhaps what should be aspired to is 'good enough judicial oversight'. At the very least this requires scrutiny of the actual practices of the police, not simply a bare recital of structures which may or may not function.
